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CONTRIBUTOR
(Page 2 of 3)
The challenge demonstrates a dilemma for the opposition groups: they can't develop a better alternative process, nor are they willing to enter the regime-controlled game. While the rationale of “the insiders” is to induce a political trickle-down transition in Burma by playing within the existing parameters, the vow of “the mainstreamers” is to create trickle-up change by mobilizing the masses.
However, the political opportunity available to the domain of the principled opposition groups is still scanty. Recently, the new government appeared to offer a three-pronged approach to the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which are (1) recognition of the existing regime, (2) talks between government representative Aung Kyi and Suu Kyi , and (3) the latter’s involvement in government poverty alleviation efforts. This three-level approach is in fact a resumption of what United Nations proposed in the wake of the brutal crackdown on the 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” in which the UN special envoy on Burma encouraged the junta and Suu Kyi to cooperate on recognition of the regime’s roadmap, meaningful and time-bound talks and a broad-based poverty alleviation commission. The junta’s supremo, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, then scratched the UN’s proposal after a period of using it to diffuse international criticism of the 2007 crackdown. Although Thein Sein, the president of the new government, might now intend to reemploy such tools of resolution without the UN or any other third party’s involvement, the concession he could make may be nothing more than allowing Suu Kyi to play within the existing game with the provision of some face-saving tickets for the Lady. Unless Suu Kyi manages to pull off a better alternative, she will have to go along with this supply-side-driven transition package. However, the scenario regarding the ethnic resistance groups such as the ceasefire armies is more complicated. The new regime finds itself ineffective in crushing defiant groups such as the Kachin Independence Army and even smaller splinter groups like the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, thanks to its own weak military capability, the new regime's lack of legitimacy, and the direct geopolitical constraints imposed by neighboring countries. However, ethnic groups will also not survive on military defense alone. They may eventually be forced by the regime as well as geopolitical pressures to enter political negotiations within the framework of the 2008 Constitution. Depending on the unity or divisiveness among intra- and inter-ethnic groups, the gains they achieve from the new regime will be uneven. Generally speaking, the principled opposition groups—ethnic as well as urban forces—in Burma are perhaps by default most likely to make news headlines because they constantly bear the brunt of repression and injustice inflicted by the brutal regime. But they are so far losing control of the political trend-lines because of limited political opportunity available to their domain. At the same time, they haven’t been successful in creating their own political opportunity that would allow them to advance a better alternative. Our analysis thus far demonstrates that the regime possesses overall control over the political trend, while the opposition—both “the insiders” and “the mainstreamers”—hold significant sway over specific issues and arenas in terms of power distribution. In other words, the regime controls a new parameter of politics and also to a large extent contains the domain of “the mainstreamers,” including the capabilities of Suu Kyi and even of major ceasefire groups such as the ethnic Wa. However, “the insiders” (those who play within the regime-controlled game) manage to affect the ways of “access to power” through their embeddedness and contestation of the available parameter. Though the evidence is not yet conclusive, the relative openness and the boundary-spanning efforts of these players in specific arenas such as media, civil society and even the legislature should not be understated. At the same time, the “mainstreamers” have significant control over some issues, such as the removal of economic sanctions, in addition to substantive public support and Western backing for their dedicated leaders—especially Suu Kyi. However, the lack of coordination between players of two domains has in fact weakened the strength of the “insiders” as well as the “mainstreamers,” and has perhaps given even more leverage to “hardliners” within the new regime in their pursuit of personal or institutional rivalries. Of course, the possibility of spontaneous public outrage and explosion can’t be ruled out if there is a disruption of the day-to-day survival of ordinary people or a communal conflict, such as anti-Chinese riots. COMMENTS (9)
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