The Burmese military junta is at its happiest when history repeats itself. Under the leadership of Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the regime replays its old maneuvers—content that its strategy has for so long been unbreakable.

A recognizable play in the regime's game plan has long been the tactic of combining brute force and naked aggression through harsh crackdowns with political offensives aimed at weakening the opposition and defusing international pressure.

But if the regime’s policymakers are so predictable, surely the question is what the opposition will do to counter their plans and achieve the two most important results for political transition— constitutional reform and the release of political prisoners.

Take, for starters, the case of the 2,100 political prisoners languishing in Burma’s jails—234 of whom were arrested during or after the nationwide protests in September 2007 and have received sentences of up to 68 years imprisonment each since November 2008.

The goal of the harsh sentencing is clear—to eliminate potential opposition in the run-up to the 2010 election, which is the fifth step in the regime's master-plan known as the “Seven-Step Roadmap to Democracy.”

The intended effect of the brutality is a "shock and awe" campaign—terrorizing the public and creating an environment of fear ahead of the election. The junta hopes the Burmese population will become depoliticized and will meekly allow the military to steal the election.

International outcry has been routinely announced time and again. Sources in the United Nations said that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is even considering the option of temporarily suspending his Good Offices mission in Burma. Some sources close to the Burmese Foreign Ministry have confirmed that China and Russia are pressing the generals in Naypyidaw to cooperate with the Secretary-General's Good Offices and offer up a positive gesture to calm down the mounting international criticism before the scheduled 2010 election in Burma.

As history repeats itself, it would now be time for Than Shwe to show his cards and use his charm with his international supporters. One possible prospect will be the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader and the only imprisoned Noble Peace Prize winner, in the near future– as early as May or as late as November 2009 – which in itself presents what the junta considers to be several favorable conditions.

First, the junta knows that releasing Suu Kyi could well be enough to relieve the concerns of China, Russia, Asean and other apologists for the junta that have found it hard recently to defend the Burmese regime in the international arena.

If the military rulers were sublimely tactful, they could even lure in UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari or the Secretary-General, and allow the Good Offices to take credit for Suu Kyi’s release.

In this manner, the junta could use the release of Suu Kyi to fend off international criticism against the systematic crackdowns, the forcibly ratified constitution and the scheduled election for 2010.

In fact, the military generals believe they can afford to release the opposition leader without compromising with her. Indeed, in accepting her freedom Suu Kyi could find herself in a Catch-22 situation where she cannot criticize the government without finding herself back in a cage.

No political transition is likely to take place within the framework of the current constitution. Even amendments made to the constitution in the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within a military-dominated parliament and the junta’s foreseeable power arrangement in a post-2010 Burma.

The question, therefore, is what the opposition can do to counter the military's strategy and achieve the two most important results needed for political transition—constitutional reform and the release of political prisoners.

Over the past 20 years, the opposition parties in Burma have shown an unyielding faith in the power of principles. Now it is time for them to learn the principles of power.

Paradoxically, the first principle of power that the opposition should pursue is a moral strategy.