But at the same time it’s difficult not to feel overwhelmed by the extent of the country’s challenges. And it’s not just the legacy of war and poverty and oppression. In key areas we lack the institutions we need to move ahead. The judicial and banking systems are both key for future progress, but these systems will require enormous amounts of work before they are able to function properly. Or take education. Fifty years ago the Revolutionary Council government began to destroy what had been a first-rate system of higher education. We’re still living with the consequences and any improvement will take many years if not decades. And as in much of the rest of the region, corruption has reached levels that will be extremely difficult to reverse.
Q: During your travels to China to do research for your book, you were able to see for yourself how much that country has transformed itself economically. China's continuing rise is also having a major impact on other developing countries. What do you think about China's growing influence in Burma's economy? Do you think that Burma is in danger of becoming completely dominated by China's economic might?
A: For any poor country, being next to the fastest growing economy in the world should be a huge advantage. Chinese trade and investment can be a major asset to Burma in the future. But it’s a relationship that needs to be very carefully managed. There is an urgent need to make sure that China’s growing economic presence in Burma is something that will create jobs for ordinary people and help develop the economy in a proper way, not something that will simply fuel corruption, displace local communities or destroy the environment. But this is easier said than done. Developing the state institutions we need to do this will take a very long time. I suppose it’s possible that Burma could become completely dominated by China’s economic might, but I don’t think it’s likely; nationalism in Burma has long been very strong and if there is to be an end to Western sanctions in the near future, I think we’ll see a more balanced relationship with China. My fear is actually the opposite: that a very negative view of China has crept up over the past many years, and there could well be a backlash, and that would be a tragedy for both countries.
Q: Some analysts have suggested that the Burmese government's recent moves toward reform are aimed at improving relations with the West as a means of counterbalancing China's influence. Do you think there is a danger that, far from benefiting from its key strategic position in the region, Burma could become a battleground for the competing interests of China, India and the West, as well as other regional players such as Thailand and Japan?
A: There’s good competition and there’s bad competition. If Burma is seen as increasingly important, because of its natural wealth or geographic position, and this leads to healthy competition from the West, China, India and elsewhere for access to Burma, then that’s good, as long as new business and other ties are well managed. A good government could make sure that the country gets the best possible deal. But of course it would not be good if Burma actually became a “battleground” in a literal way, or if a corrupt government was unable or unwilling to manage growing international business interests in a way that benefited the majority of people. In general, though, I think moving away from over-reliance on any one country is extremely important.
Q: You have actively argued against Western economic sanctions imposed on Burma. Do you think that Burma's rulers would have made any concessions if they hadn't been under pressure from the West? Couldn't last year's election and President Thein Sein's meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi earlier this year, for example, be attributed largely to a desire to end the sanctions?
A: No, not at all. Nothing the old junta did over the past twenty years suggests that a desire to end sanctions was high on their agenda. We have to be mindful of what the sanctions actually are. They include, for example, restrictions on the international financial institutions providing technical assistance and the effective ban on the UNDP having a normal development program in the country. Even now, it’s not entirely clear that these things would be welcome. I think the old junta always wanted to normalize relations with the West and wanted a relaxation of sanctions as a sign of better relations, but I don’t think they actually wanted many of the things that would come with an end to sanctions, such as more development aid or an increased international presence.
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