Would you care to comment on that? Can you tell us who you did meet while you were in Burma?
A: I had no prior plans to meet anyone. Therefore, I would not have known if some activists and politicians did not want to meet me. I met with the National League for Democracy, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, Rakhine National Democratic Party, All Mon Regions Democratic Party, Chin National Party, National Democratic Force, Democratic Party— Myanmar, Peace & Democracy Party, Union Democracy Party and Peace and Unity Party. I didn't meet the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National Unity Party.
Q: Were the parties you met the same ones that the Euro-Burma Office provided financial support to during last year's election?
A: We did not provide financial support to any political parties. It would have been deemed illegal and the parties would have been deregistered. When we said we would support the people who wanted to contest the elections, people equated it with funding for political parties. That was not the case. Our intent was not to create political parties and partisanship. We wanted people to know their rights and to be able to use the voting and parliamentary system to achieve their goals. We gave funding to organizations to provide training on democratic principles, forming political parties, mobilizing voters, elections and how free and fairs elections are conducted. We also enabled groups to monitor the elections. The trainees never knew the funding came from us and we never knew the political affiliation of the trainees—some could have even been from the USDP or NUP [the pro-military National Unity Party]. So there is no way for me to determine if any of the people I met benefited from the training funded by the Euro-Burma Office.
Q: What are your views on the supposed split between hardliners and reformers in the new government? What do you think of the suspension of the Myitsone dam, in terms of what it says about these divisions?
A: I personally do not believe that it is an issue of reformers versus hardliners. Everybody in the leadership wants the new government to succeed. That is the whole plan of the SPDC [the State Peace and Development Council, the former junta]—to legitimize military rule. The differences in the leadership are about personal rivalries and concerns about whether President Thein Sein in trying to legitimize military rule is going too far and too fast with his reforms. But if the reforms work, the concerns will be allayed and the so-called hardliners will agree with the reforms. The suspension of the dam has financial implications for some of the leaders. If these are addressed or compensated, it will have no significant effect on the power structure.
Q: Some members of the government have been identified as reformers, while others are seen as more resistant to reform. Many others, however, appear to be sitting on the fence. How do you think they could be persuaded to join the reformist side?
A: Most people are probably fence-sitters. Under the system set up by Gen Ne Win fifty years ago and continued by the Burmese Socialist Programme Party, the State Law and Order Restoration Council and the State Peace and Development Council, you survive by sitting on the fence and waiting for things to settle down. Once it becomes clear which way the wind is blowing, everyone will join in. There is no need to persuade any one.
Q: On the ethnic conflict front, you have advocated one-on-one negotiations between the government and armed ethnic groups to achieve ceasefire agreements (as advocated by the government), followed by an inclusive dialogue involving all of the armed groups together (as advocated by the United Nationalities Federal Council) to reach a lasting political solution. However, many ethnic armed groups regard the first phase of this process as a “divide and conquer” tactic. If this approach were adopted, how soon do you think that the second phase could be initiated?
A: Let us be clear on this point—I have always advocated a political solution. But how it is done is for the combatants themselves to decide. The government is proposing a four-step process: first, ceasefire; second, exchange of liaison offices; third, prior notification when entering each other’s territory; and fourth, political dialogue. Steps 1-3 are to be done at the state level and step 4 with Naypyidaw. I have said that in order to start a political dialogue, there must first be a cessation of hostilities.