It essentially assumes that the Tatmadaw enjoys the support of the nation and, according to Maung Aung Myoe, is “built on a system of ‘total people’s defense,’ [whereby] the armed forces provide the first line of defense, and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defense.
“It is designed,” he added, “to deter potential aggressors [with] the knowledge that the defeat of the Tatmadaw in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerilla warfare in the occupied areas by militias and dispersed regular troops, [which] would eventually wear down the invader.”
Ne Win adopted the people’s war concept to combat insurgency and the threat of communists in the 1970s and 1980s. Ne Win’s government was able to mobilize civilians, villagers, war veterans’ organizations, militias and even students and youths, and provided them with basic military training. When the insurgents’ threat was neutralized, Ne Win and his commanders declared that the people’s war had defeated Burma’s enemies.
Nowadays, in almost every speech to commanders and soldiers, the army leaders—including Than Shwe—remind them of the need for a people’s war and to nurture the support of the masses. Than Shwe’s call is for a “people’s war under modern conditions,” wrote Maung Aung Myoe. Interestingly, under Than Shwe’s people’s war, the concept of cyber warfare has also been launched.
In 1998, the Tatmadaw held its first joint military exercises of the navy, the air force and the army to introduce counteroffensive strategies to the existing people’s war doctrine.
During these exercises, the fire brigade, the Myanmar Red Cross and the Union Solidarity Development Association were mobilized. “The exercises,” Maung Aung Myoe wrote, “revealed that the purpose of such a counteroffensive was to counter low-level foreign invasion.”
According to the author, the new doctrine developed under the regime dictates that, should the standing conventional force fail to defeat an invading force on the beachheads or landing zones, resistance would be organized at the village, regional and national levels to sap the will of the invading force. When the enemy’s will is sapped and its capabilities are dispersed and exhausted, the Burmese army would be able to muster sufficient force to wage a counteroffensive that would drive the invader from Burma.
Intelligence sources revealed that Than Shwe and senior military officers sat in a war room and discussed war games plans. One inevitable inland route was identified as Burma’s historical adversary, Thailand.
Burmese leaders have never hidden their suspicion that Thailand’s annual Cobra Gold joint military exercise with the US and regional forces are a potential threat to Burma.
Aside from Thailand, Burmese military officers also pored over the invasion plans of “Operation Desert Storm” in Iraq, the US-Afghanistan War and the recent Kosovo War, paying particular attention to US strategies.
They have also studied tunnel warfare with specific regard to North Korean defense. Burma has sent several delegations to Pyongyang since normalizing relations with North Korea last year, but military sources have confirmed that Burma’s late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win implemented tunnel warfare strategies as early as 2000.
Although a series of underground routes was supposedly built in central Burma, it is believed the program was halted after Chinese officials convinced Soe Win that tunnel warfare was no longer a viable option due to the introduction of the US-made BLU-82B/ C-130 weapon, nicknamed “daisy cutters,” that has been employed successfully in Afghanistan to destroy Taliban underground complexes and caves.
Many social and philosophical reasons for moving the Burmese capital to Naypyidaw have been aired, but in the end, it was a strategic military maneuver.
“Until and unless one [side] commits its ground force to capture its [enemy’s] military headquarters, a war cannot be declared over,” Maung Aung Myoe wrote. “The moving of the capital and military high command from Yangon (Rangoon) to Naypyitaw (Naypyidaw) clearly reflects the underlying military thinking and war fighting strategy of the Tatmadaw.”
The author argued that an amphibious landing on the west coast of Burma, and a simultaneous land-based invasion from the eastern Karen or Karenni State would not only cut off Rangoon from Upper Burma, but also make it a target for attacks from the south.